In July, we shared the news that a court in in Colombia had granted a writ of habeas corpus to a 19-year-old spectacled bear named Chucho. An attorney and law professor at the Universidad Manuela Beltrán, Luis Domingo Gómez Maldonado, filed a petition for the writ, modeled after the NhRP’s chimpanzee rights litigation in the US, after learning that the Corporación Autónoma Regional de Caldas (Corpocaldas) had used its authority as the entity responsible for environmental management in the region to transfer Chucho from the Río Blanco Nature Reserve to the Barranquilla City Zoo.
In so doing, Luis argued, Corpocaldas had deprived Chucho of his freedom, severely compromising his physical and emotional well-being and violating his fundamental rights. In a first for Colombian animal law jurisprudence, Judge Luis Armando Tolosa Villabona agreed, granting the writ on July 26th and ordering Chucho transferred within 30 days to a habitat with “full and dignified conditions in semi-captivity,” most likely La Planada Nature Reserve, where other spectacled bears live in the cloud forests of the Andes’ western slope. “If fictitious legal entities [such as corporations] are subjects of rights,” he wrote, “for what reason should those who are alive or are ‘sentient beings’ not be so?” [Click here to read the ruling in its original Spanish or here to read an English translation by NhRP supporter Javier Salcedo]
Unfortunately, but not necessarily unexpectedly, a panel of the Colombian Supreme Court reversed the ruling in August, writing that “the writ of habeas corpus is inappropriate in the present case, because it was designed for persons, rational animals, not for nonhuman or irrational animals, and the foundations of such a decision [i.e. granting a writ of habeas corpus to Chucho] are incompatible with the purpose for which the writ was created.” Luis is now appealing Chucho’s case to the Colombian Constitutional Court, which could decide to revise the Supreme Court’s ruling.
No matter what happens next, it’s no small thing for a judge to draw on existing laws, science, and philosophy to consider—much less recognize—the legal personhood and rights of a nonhuman animal and affirm the role courts must play in this urgent public policy debate. To do so is to challenge a legal status quo according to which, in Judge Villabona’s words, “[Nonhuman] animals have been considered things, goods over which we exercise our property rights; their capacity to feel or suffer has been ignored.”
As Luis awaits the Constitutional Court’s decision, I talked to him about why he filed a habeas petition on Chucho’s behalf, how the Colombian legal system views and treats nonhuman animals, and what we have to gain in recognizing nonhuman rights, and more. With the translation assistance of Javier Salcedo, we present the interview in both English and Spanish:
How long have you been an animal advocate?
¿Hace cuánto tiempo que usted se dedica a la defensoría de los animales?
Luis: I have always been sensitive to animals. Nevertheless, for 10 years now my wife María Cecilia and I have gotten in the habit of helping vulnerable and unprotected animals in different ways, particularly cats and dogs. We have adopted some of them and helped others get medicines or have surgeries, and we have made animal food donations to several foster homes.
Currently we have 21 dogs, 5 of [whom] live with us in our home. The other 16 live in our farm, where they lead a free life and forget, in some cases, their past experiences of mistreatment and abandonment.
La sensibilidad por los animales siempre ha estado presente. Sin embargo, desde hace unos 10 años con mi esposa María Cecilia hemos adoptado el hábito de ayudar de manera directa a alguno animales en estado de desprotección, especialmente a perros y gatos, a estos les hemos ayudado de diferentes formas, algunos adoptándolos, otros colaborando con tratamientos específicos como cirugías, medicamentos y participando con donaciones de alimento para hogares.
Actualmente tenemos 21 perros, cinco (5) viven con nosotros en casa y dieciséis (16) están en la finca, allí llevan una vida en libertad y olvidan, en algunos casos, experiencias de malos tratos y abandono.
How would you describe how the Colombian legal system views and treats nonhuman animals?
¿De qué manera piensa usted que el sistema legal colombiano considera y trata a los animales no-humanos?
Luis: I think the Colombian legal system treats nonhuman animals with great consideration for their protection, partly because of the outstanding jurisprudential breakthroughs made by the Constitutional Court, and partly because of the efforts of the Colombian Congress that led to the enactment of Law 1774 of 2016, which changed their legal regime and overturned their traditional categorization as things in order to typify them as sentient beings.
The Constitutional Court, among other relevant decisions, has declared by means of Sentence C-041 of 2017 that “a reasonable logic allows us to understand that, from the fact that nonhuman animals cannot directly demand an adequate treatment for themselves or exact that their rights be respected, it does not follow that we must dispense with their safeguard. Their helpless condition necessitates the figure of representation or of human agency, and instruments such as class actions or actions of protection might be in order as long as the proper regulation is established” (p. 55). This situation reflects a full commitment to the protection of nonhuman animals’ rights.
Once stripped of the juridical status of things and categorized as sentient beings, nonhuman animals become holders of some prerogatives articulated through the principles of protection and animal welfare, as is legally mandated by Article 3 of Law 1774 of 2016.
The principle of protection implies that our dealings with nonhuman animals must be founded on respect, solidarity, compassion, ethics, justice, care, on the prevention of their suffering, on the suppression of their captivity and of their abandonment, and on the eradication of any form of abuse, mistreatment, violence or cruelty towards them.
The principle of animal welfare implies that those who are responsible for or keep nonhuman animals must safeguard, as a minimum, that: (i) The animal does not suffer from hunger or thirst; (ii) The animal does not suffer from unjustified physical discomfort or pain; (iii) the animal does not develop an illness because of negligence or disregard; (iv) the animal is not exposed to fearful or stressful conditions; and (v) the animal can behave naturally.
Creo que el sistema legal colombiano trata a los animales no-humanos con un gran criterio de protección, de un lado gracias a los notables avances jurisprudenciales de la Corte Constitucional y, de otra parte a los esfuerzos del Congreso de la República que con la expedición de la Ley 1774 de 2016 varió el régimen jurídico de los animales no-humanos, derogando el tratamiento que históricamente los ubicaba como cosas e introdujo un trato de seres sensibles.
La Corte Constitucional, entre otras decisiones relevantes, se ha pronunciado mediante Sentencia C-041 de 2017, señalando que “una lógica de lo razonable permite comprender que el hecho de que los animales no puedan reclamar directamente un buen trato o el respeto por sus derechos, no significa que deba prescindirse de su garantía, Su condición de indefensión haría forzosa la figura de la representación o agencia humana, pudiendo ser un instrumento efectivo las acciones populares o incluso la acción de tutela, mientras se establece la regulación. (p. 55)”, situación que refleja una total adhesión a la protección de los derechos de los animales no- humanos.
Al ser despojados de la condición jurídica de cosa y pasar a ser un seres sintientes, los animales también, por mandato legal dispuesto en la Ley 1774 de 2016, pasan a ser titulares de algunas prerrogativas estructuradas a través de los principios de protección y de bienestar animal, tal como se refleja en el artículo 3 de la referida Ley.
El principio de protección implica que el trato a los animales se fundamenta en el respeto, la solidaridad, la compasión, la ética, la justicia, el cuidado, la prevención del sufrimiento, la erradicación del cautiverio y el abandono, así como cualquier forma de abuso, maltrato, violencia, y trato cruel.
El bienestar animal como principio implica que el cuidado de los animales impone a los responsables o tenedores el deber de asegurar como mínimo: i) que no sufran hambre ni sed, ii) que no sufran injustificadamente malestar físico ni dolor, iii) que no les sean provocadas enfermedades por negligencia o descuido, iv) que no sean sometidos a condiciones de miedo y estrés y, v) que puedan manifestar su comportamiento natural.
What compelled you to file suit on Chucho’s behalf?
¿Qué lo motivó para iniciar una demanda a favor de Chucho?
Luis: The main motivation consisted in the fact that it seemed undeserved to me that Chucho was condemned at 24 years old to live in captivity in the Zoo of Barranquilla, a city located in the Caribbean region and whose climatic conditions are very different from those Chucho had been accustomed to. Chucho had until then lived in natural reserves for his entire life, first in La Planada, during his early years, and then in the Río Blanco natural reserve near the city of Manizales. Both places belong to the Andean region and possess a cloud forest ecosystem.
La motivación principal radicó en que me pareció desproporcionado que Chucho, quien había pasado toda su vida viviendo en reservas naturales, primero en la Planada en el Departamento de Nariño, durante sus primeros años y luego en el Reserva de Rio Blanco en la ciudad de Manizales, lugares pertenecientes a la Región Andina y con un ecosistema de bosque de niebla, a sus 24 años de edad fuera condenado a vivir en condición de cautiverio en el Zoológico de Barranquilla que se encuentra ubicada en la Región Caribe donde las condiciones climáticas son bastante diferentes a las que Chucho se encontraba habituado.
How would you describe the significance of Colombia’s “sentient being” statute, both in terms of the initial decision in Chucho’s case and in general?
¿Para usted, cuál es el significado de que en Colombia se otorgue a los animales no-humanos el estatus de “seres sintientes”, tanto en términos generales como en términos de la primera decisión en el caso de Chucho?
Luis: It represents a great progress in the relationship between human and nonhuman animals. It also opens new spaces for us to understand the appropriate behavior we must exhibit as individuals towards nonhuman animals, and it helps us realize that the relationship our society has with any nonhuman living being must be governed by respect.
It also represents the acknowledgment of a historical reality that in recent times has elicited an important awareness and adhesion from the part of many sectors of society. These sectors now consider nonhuman animals as beings capable of communicating their feelings, of reacting to pain and even of conveying their sadness—phenomena that we who have the chance of being close to nonhuman animals know very well.
Constituye un auténtico avance en la relación entre los animales humanos y los no – humanos, nos ayuda a entender como sociedad que la relación debe estar gobernada por una trato respetuoso hacia cualquier ser viviente diferente a los humanos.
Es el reconocimiento de una realidad histórica, pero que en épocas recientes viene adquiriendo gran reconocimiento y, adhesión creciente por parte de diversos sectores de la sociedad que, ven en los animales no- humanos a seres capaces de trasmitir sentimientos, que reaccionan ante el dolor e incluso son capaces de trasmitir eventos de tristeza, cosas que sabemos muy bien quienes nos damos la oportunidad de tener animales no-humanos cerca a nuestras vidas.
What kind of reaction did you see on the part of the Barranquilla Zoo to Judge Luis Armando Tolosa Villabona’s decision?
¿Qué tipo de reacción pudo usted observar por parte del Zoológico de Barranquilla ante la decisión del Juez Luis Armando Tolosa Villabona?
Luis: Unfortunately, it was a reaction highly contrary to Chucho’s interests and that disqualified the work the defense had pushed forward. Its reaction also included a discourse where they asserted the non-existence of nonhuman animal rights, a somewhat atypical stance for an institution devoted to the protection of nonhuman animals.
Infortunadamente fue una reacción bastante contraria a los intereses de Chucho, descalificadora respecto del trabajo de defensoría que se adelantaba y, extrañamente con un discurso que afirma la inexistencia de los derechos de los animales no-humanos, situación que es bien extraña viniendo de una institución que se dedica al cuidado de animales.
How would you characterize the Supreme Court’s rationale for having overturned Judge Villabona’s decision? What is your next step?
¿Cómo calificaría usted la justificación que le permitió a la Suprema Corte anular la decisión del Juez Tolosa Villabona? ¿Cuáles serán sus próximos pasos a seguir?
Luis: The Labor Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice knew of the action of protection filed against the decision that granted the writ of Habeas Corpus to Chucho, and it determined to derogate the protection granted by the Office of Judge Tolosa Villabona. The Court employed a rather classic and outdated argument based on the idea that the finality of the mechanism of Habeas Corpus consists of protecting the freedom of human animals, and thus that it was not possible to use it for exacting the protection of a nonhuman one.
Such a decision was challenged in the Criminal Chamber of the same Court, which confirmed the first verdict by reasserting the formalist argument.
I assume that such a behavior replicates the answer given by the Justice System, an answer that relies on old paradigms that codify an understanding of forms as the more relevant element in the job of delivering justice, that are not troubled by the urgency of solving in an adequate and up-to-date manner the problems that may arise, and that thereby ignore the current interests of society.
Fortunately, the action of protection is now being directed to the Constitutional Court, where it will possibly be revised. I have the legitimate confidence that we are facing an issue of juridical relevance, and I sincerely hope that the Court, paying attention to its own trajectory and inspired by its immense wisdom, will select it for revision. Should this happen, the Colombian conception of nonhuman animals’ rights will be subjected to a profound re-assessment, and the return of Chucho to the Río Blanco or to the La Planada natural reserves, the places he should never have taken from, will be mandatory.
La Sala Laboral de la Corte Suprema de Justicia conoció en primera instancia la acción de tutela interpuesta en contra del fallo que concedió el Habeas Corpus, resolviendo dejar sin efecto la protección brindada por el Despacho del Magistrado Tolosa Villabona, usando un argumento bastante clásico y desactualizado, indicando que el mecanismo de protección constitucional de habeas corpus tiene como fin la protección de la libertad de animales humanos y por tanto no era posible proteger por esa vía a un animal no-humano.
Dicha decisión fue objeto de impugnación ante la Sala Penal de la misma Corte, la cual confirmó la decisión de primera instancia, reiterando el argumento formalista.
Asumo que dicho proceder obedece a una respuesta dada por el Sistema Judicial amparado en viejos paradigmas que ven en las formas el elemento más relevante del oficio de administrar justicia y, poco se preocupan por resolver de manera adecuada y actualiza los problemas que se ponen a su consideración, y, por esa vía terminan desconociendo los intereses actuales de la sociedad.
Afortunadamente ahora ese fallo de tutela debe ir a la Corte Constitucional a surtir el trámite de eventual revisión, de corazón y con la confianza legítima de estar frente a un asunto de relevancia jurídica, y espero que la Corte en su inmensa sabiduría y atendiendo su trayectoria decisional, la elija para ser revisada y se someta a un juicio profundo la concepción de los derechos de los animales en la sociedad colombiana y, por esa vía se ordene que chucho regrese a Río Blanco o a la Planada, lugar de donde nunca debió salir.
In your view, what do we humans have to lose in denying rights to nonhuman animals? What do we have to gain?
De acuerdo con usted, ¿qué tenemos los seres humanos que perder al negar que los animales no-humanos posean derechos? ¿Y qué tenemos que ganar?
Luis: When human beings reject nonhuman animals’ rights, we miss the opportunity to live harmoniously with our environment, we degrade our sensitivity and our capacity for being amazed by the numerous experiences they might elicit in us, and we alienate the possibility of abandoning the infliction of pain and suffering as forms of conduct towards the weakest.
If, on the other hand, we acknowledge nonhuman animals’ rights, we gain mighty allies in the project of keeping our existence on Earth as something feasible, and we can benefit from a context where the ecosystems are respected and where better standards for the lives of future generations (that is, contexts with less pain and suffering) prevail.
Definitivamente cuando los humanos negamos los derechos de los animales no-humanos perdemos la posibilidad de vivir en armonía con nuestro medio, perdemos sensibilidad frente a manifestaciones de afecto y de asombro por las múltiples experiencias que los seres sintientes nos puedan facilitar, perdemos la oportunidad de abandonar el dolor y el sufrimiento como pedagogía de trato frente a los más débiles.
Al reconocer los derechos de los animales no- humanos ganamos grandes aliados en el propósito de mantener viable el proyecto del hombre en la tierra, en un contexto de respeto con el ecosistema y de mayores estándares de vida para las generaciones venideras, esto es con menor dolor y sufrimiento.
Thank you, Luis! We’ll keep everyone posted on the status of this case.
For more info:
Chucho, el oso de anteojos que triunfó en la Corte Suprema de Justicia (Semana, 7/28/17)
Chucho, the Spectacled Bear, Triumphs in the Court of Justice (English translation by NhRP supporter Carmen Mandel, a technical writer and information designer who advocates for a compassionate lifestyle and the advancement of nonhuman rights)
Habeas corpus para ‘Chucho,’ el oso (Andrea Padilla Villarraga, El Espectador, 7/28/17)
Habeas corpus for Chucho the bear (English translation by NhRP supporter Javier Salcedo, a professor of philosophy and logic at the National Autonomous University of Mexico and at the Autonomous Technological Institute of MexicoJavier who is a passionate advocate of nonhuman animal rights since 2010).
Toward Hominid and Other Humanoid Rights: Are We Witnessing a Legal Revolution? (Saskia Stucki, Verfassungblog, 12/30/16)
Habea(r)s Corpus: Some Thoughts on the Role of Habeas Corpus in the Evolution of Animal Rights (Saskia Stucki, I-CONnect, 11/4/17
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