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On Appeal: 4th Judicial District El Paso County; Hon. Eric Bentley; Case Number 2023CV31326

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Petitioner-Appellant:

THE NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, INC. on behalf of Missy, Kimba, Lucky, LouLou, and Jambo,

v.

Respondents-Appellees:

CHEYENNE MOUNTAIN ZOOLOGICAL SOCIETY, and BOB CHASTAIN, in his official capacity as President and CEO of Cheyenne Mountain Zoological Society.

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BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE SHANNON MINTER AND EVAN WOLFSON

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I certify that this brief complies with all requirements of C.A.R. 28(a)(2) & (3), C.A.R. 32, and C.A.R. 29.

This brief complies with the word limits set forth in C.A.R. 29(d) (an amicus brief may be no more than one-half the length authorized for a party's principal brief). It contains 4,638 words.

I acknowledge that my brief may be stricken if it fails to comply with any of the requirements of C.A.R. 28, C.A.R. 32, and C.A.R. 29.

/s/ Roberta Nieslanik
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Attorney for Amici Curiae
Shannon Minter and Evan Wolfson

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES2
IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
ARGUMENT4
I. Much as in prior cases brought by others formerly excluded, oppressed, or deemed too "different," the liberty claims of non-human beings such as Missy, Kimba, Lucky, LouLou, and Jambo present significant and substantial concerns that courts must meaningfully address, not arbitrarily turn away.
II. Relief for Missy, Kimba, Lucky, LouLou, and Jambo does not turn on constricted conceptions of personhood, but rather on whether these intelligent non-humans share some right to liberty protected by habeas corpus
III. The shared liberty interest and the need for relief are similarities that easily outweigh differences concerning an overly narrow definition of personhood.
CONCLUSION21

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

	Page(s)
Cases	
Baehr v. Miike, 910 P.2d 112 (1996)	3
Baker v. Nelson, 490 U.S. 810 (1972)	9
Boy Scouts of America v. James Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000)	3
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)	6, 8-14
Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010)	1
Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286 (1969)	11
<i>In re Marriage Cases</i> , 43 Cal. 4th 757 (Cal. 2008)	1
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)	6-9, 12-15
Matter of Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery, 152 A.D.3d 73 (1st 2017)	_
Matter of Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery, 31 N.Y.3d 1054 (2018)	7, 14, 20
Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Breheny, 38 N.Y.3d 555 (2022)	13
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015)	2, 9
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996)	10
Statutes and Rules	
C.A.R. 29	1
NY State Senate Bill S4248 (2021)	15
Or. Rev. Stat. § 167.305	16

Other Authorities

"Guide Dogs for the Blind and American Foundation for the Blind Launch Extensive Research Study," Business Wire (Oct. 21, 2020)19
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Katie Sykes, Human Drama, Animal Trials: What the Medieval Animal Trials Can Teach Us About Justice for Animals, 17 ANIMAL L. 273 (2011)16
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Meredith Geaghan-Breiner and Kyle Desiderio, "How 10 Different Types of Animals Train for Film and TV Roles," Insider (Apr. 19, 2021)20
Penny Leigh, Dogs in Demand for Explosives Detection Work in U.S.," American Kennel Club (Apr. 13, 2018)
Philip Johnson, "The Advocate, or the Hour of the Pig"15
Poppy Koronka, "The Best Guard Dogs, According to Experts," Newsweek (Jul. 16, 2021)17

Samantha Mathewson, "Celebrating the animal astronauts who paved the way for human spaceflight," Space (Dec. 28, 2021)
Sara Kiley Watson, "Humans have partnered with sled dogs for 9,500 years," Popular Science (Jul. 14, 2020)
Sara M. Butler, "Persons under the Law? Medieval Animal Rights – Legal History Miscellany"16
Simon Spichak, MSc, "Training Dogs to Diagnose Parkinson's," Being Patient (Dec. 13, 2021)
Suzanne Monyak, "When the Law Recognizes Animals as People," The New Republic (Feb. 2, 2018)
Tiffany Rizzo, "At Naples Therapeutic Center, horses help with grief and mental health," Wink News (Dec. 16, 2021)
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IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

Amici Shannon Minter, Esq. and Evan Wolfson, Esq. submit this brief of amici curiae pursuant to C.A.R. 29. Amici are attorneys and longtime leaders in the LGBT movement, with experience and expertise in achieving social transformation and advancing rights and inclusion. They believe courts have a particular obligation to scrutinize measures that exclude or harm those who are vulnerable, stigmatized, and underrepresented by the political system.

Shannon Minter is the Legal Director of the National Center for Lesbian Rights (NCLR), one of the nation's leading advocacy organizations for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people. Minter was lead counsel for some same-sex couples in the landmark California marriage equality case which held that same-sex couples have the fundamental right to marry and that laws that discriminate based on sexual orientation are inherently discriminatory and subject to the highest level of constitutional scrutiny. *In re Marriage Cases*, 43 Cal. 4th 757 (Cal. 2008). Minter was also NCLR's lead attorney in *Christian Legal Society v. Martinez*, 561 U.S. 661 (2010), a U.S. Supreme Court decision upholding student group policies prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity, and rejecting the argument that such policies violated a student group's rights to freedom of speech, religion, and association. NCLR represented Hastings Outlaw, an LGBTQ student

group who intervened to help defend the nondiscrimination policy. Minter was also counsel for same-sex couples from Tennessee in *Obergefell v. Hodges*, 576 U.S. 644 (2015).

In 2009, Minter was named a "California Lawyer of the Year" by *California Lawyer*. In 2008, he was named among six "Lawyers of the Year" by *Lawyers USA* and among "California's Top 100 Lawyers" by the legal publication *The Daily Journal*. He also received the 2008 Dan Bradley Award from the National Gay and Lesbian Bar Association for outstanding work in marriage cases and was the recipient of the Cornell Law School Exemplary Public Service Award.

In 2005, Minter was one of 18 people to receive the Ford Foundation's "Leadership for a Changing World" award. In 2004, he was awarded an Honorary Degree from the City University of New York School of Law for his advocacy on behalf of same-sex couples and their families. Minter has also received the Anderson Prize Foundation's "Creating Change Award" by the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force and the Distinguished National Service Award from GAYLAW, the bar association for LGBTQ lawyers, law students, and legal professionals in Washington, D.C., Cornell Law School's Exemplary Public Service Award, the Unity Award from Bay Area Lawyers for Individual Freedom, the Advocacy Award

from the San Francisco Bar Association, the Justice Award from Equality California, and the Gerald B. Roemer award from DOJ Pride.

Evan Wolfson founded and led Freedom to Marry, the campaign to win marriage for same-sex couples in the United States. He is widely considered the architect of the freedom to marry movement that led to nationwide victory in 2015. In 1983, Wolfson wrote his Harvard Law School thesis on gay people and the freedom to marry. During the 1990s he served as co-counsel in the historic Hawaii marriage case, Baehr v. Milke, 910 P.2d 112 (1996), that launched the ongoing global movement for the freedom to marry. He has participated in numerous gay rights and HIV/AIDS cases. Wolfson earned a B.A. in history from Yale College in 1978 and a J.D. from Harvard Law School in 1983. He served as a Peace Corps volunteer in a Togo, West Africa village before law school. He wrote, Why Marriage Matters: America, Equality, and Gay People's Right to Marry, published by Simon & Schuster in July 2004. Citing his national leadership on marriage and his appearance before the U.S. Supreme Court in Boy Scouts of America v. James Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000), The National Law Journal in 2000 named Wolfson one of "the 100 most influential lawyers in America." Newsweek/The Daily Beast dubbed Wolfson "the godfather of gay marriage" and Time magazine named him one of "the

100 most influential people in the world." In 2012, Wolfson received the Barnard Medal of Distinction alongside President Barack Obama.

Since achieving his goal of winning marriage equality for same-sex couples across the United States in 2015, Wolfson has devoted his time to advising and assisting diverse movements and causes in the U.S. and around the world to adapt the model and apply the lessons that made the Freedom to Marry campaign successful in the U.S. For example, under the banner of Freedom to Marry Global, he leads a team of attorneys and experts advising efforts to win marriage, non-discrimination, and decriminalization in countries around the world. Wolfson has taught law and social change as a Distinguished Visitor from Practice at Georgetown Law Center and as a Distinguished Practitioner in Grand Strategy at Yale University, where he taught last fall. He serves as Senior Counsel at Dentons, the world's largest law firm with 160+ offices in more than 80 countries.

ARGUMENT

Just as courts came to understand that, notwithstanding assertions or discredited assumptions that difference justifies denial, they have a responsibility to frame questions appropriately and to take seriously the claims and needs of gay and transgender people and other formerly excluded groups, this Court has the obligation to consider carefully Missy, Kimba, Lucky, LouLou, and Jambo's urgent liberty claims for relief.

I. Much as in prior cases brought by others formerly excluded, oppressed, or deemed too "different," the liberty claims of non-human beings such as Missy, Kimba, Lucky, LouLou, and Jambo present significant and substantial concerns that courts must meaningfully address, not arbitrarily turn away.

This case presents an issue of great public importance: Whether the courts of this state are barred from exercising their broad common law jurisdiction to hear a habeas petition on behalf of Missy, Kimba, Lucky, LouLou, and Jambo, five elephants who were born free in Africa and now live in captivity at the Cheyenne Mountain Zoo. There is no dispute that elephants are intelligent, self-aware, social creatures who are harmed by prolonged isolation and the stress of captivity. Despite this fact, the lower court dismissed their petition solely because relief is sought by non-human, rather than human, beings. This ruling improperly imposes artificial, judicially created constraints on the enormous flexibility of the common law. Nothing in the common law or prior cases addressing the scope of habeas petitions warrants slamming the courthouse door on otherwise valid petitions simply because the petitioner is not a human being. In holding otherwise, the lower court has fallen short of its responsibility to address the merits of the elephants' petitions and apply the common law to new insights and to changing social conditions.

The improper limitations at work in this case are strikingly like those identified by the Supreme Court in *Lawrence v. Texas*, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), when it struck down state laws criminalizing same-sex intimacy and reversed as wrong and short-sighted its own prior decision in *Bowers v. Hardwick*, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). As the Supreme Court rightly acknowledged in *Lawrence*, earlier rulings, including its own in *Hardwick*, asked the wrong questions. Rather than acknowledging the full breadth of the asserted constitutional privacy claim, the decision in *Hardwick* allowed the apparent novelty of the plaintiff's claim and identity as a gay man to obscure "the extent of the liberty at stake." 538 U.S. at 567.

The decision below warrants this Court's review because it betrays a similar failure to address the important questions presented by this case. To be clear, in making this comparison, amici do not suggest that the substantive issues in *Lawrence* and this case are the same, nor do they seek to make a facile comparison between the subject of this petition and LGBT people or members of other minority groups. Rather, they wish to show that the analytical errors identified by the Supreme Court when it reversed *Hardwick* can shed a powerful light on similar analytical errors by the lower court here.

Amici acknowledge forthrightly that, in this case, they do not have all the answers. But just as amici over the course of their careers as advocates have pressed

courts in other cases to fulfill their role and safeguard freedom and bodily autonomy, amici do so here as well. That we do not know all the answers is no reason for the courts, including this Court, to refuse to take the questions posed by these non-human beings' claims seriously.

II. Relief for Missy, Kimba, Lucky, LouLou, and Jambo does not turn on constricted conceptions of personhood, but rather on whether these intelligent non-humans share some right to liberty protected by habeas corpus.

Like Justice Kennedy writing for the Supreme Court in *Lawrence*, Judge Fahey explained in his concurrence in *Matter of Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery*, 31 N.Y.3d 1054 (2018) that courts must frame the threshold question in these cases carefully if they are to resolve them in a way that does justice to the importance of the values they invoke and the concerns they present. Unfortunately, thus far, the courts have not asked, as they should, whether the subject of the petition has a liberty interest that habeas must protect, but, formalistically, whether the subject is a person. "The better approach," as Justice Fahey notes, "is to ask not whether a chimpanzee fits the definition of a person..., but instead whether he or she has the right to liberty protected by habeas corpus." *Id.* at 1057 (Fahey, J., concurring). By focusing instead on whether an animal can be considered a person—a question that itself is more complex than a superficial first instinct may suggest—

courts have evaded the more fundamental question of whether intelligent, self-aware, social creatures such as Missy, Kimba, Lucky, LouLou, and Jambo have a liberty interest that the common law of habeas is capacious enough to protect. "Does an intelligent nonhuman animal who thinks and plans and appreciates life as human beings do have the right to the protection of the law against arbitrary cruelties and enforced detentions visited on him or her? This is not merely a definitional question, but a deep dilemma of ethics and policy that demands our attention." *Id.* at 1058.

Court's failure to address that central question is reminiscent of the Supreme Court's error in cases such as *Hardwick* when it focused on the identity of the plaintiff rather than the nature of the interest asserted. In *Hardwick*, the Court was presented with a claim that laws criminalizing same-sex intimacy violated the fundamental right to privacy. 478 U.S. at 188. Addressing that claim on its merits would have required a careful consideration of whether gay people have a protected privacy interest in consensual adult relationships, as the Court subsequently undertook in *Lawrence*. Instead, the Court dismissed the plaintiff's claim out of hand, ruling that because of its novelty—and because of plaintiff's stigmatized identity—the very assertion of such a claim was definitionally preposterous, or, in the Court's words, "facetious." 478 U.S. at 194. In effect, the Court held that because

the plaintiff in *Hardwick* is gay, his assertion of a right to privacy in intimate relationships warranted no consideration.¹

In *Lawrence*, the Supreme Court reversed *Hardwick* and recognized its prior error in tautologically defining the fundamental right to privacy to apply only to nongay people, simply because the right had not been applied to gay people in the past. Noting that the principles protected by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendments are deliberately broad, the Court explained that their drafters "knew times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom." 539 U.S. at 579. The same is true of the common law writ of habeas corpus, which has been broadly applied throughout our nation's history to protect individuals and groups once deemed

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¹ The Supreme Court initially adopted a similarly dismissive and cursory response to the claims of same-sex couples seeking the freedom to marry. In *Baker v. Nelson*, 490 U.S. 810 (1972), the Court dismissed a petition by a gay male couple seeking review of the Minnesota Supreme Court's denial of their right to marry with a single sentence, summarily concluding: "The appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question." Forty-three years later, the Supreme Court belatedly recognized that, to the contrary, same-sex couples have the same constitutionally protected freedom to marry as different-sex couples. *Obergefell v. Hodges*, 576 U.S. 644 (2015).

outside of the law's protection, as our understanding of the principles of equality and freedom have evolved.

The decision in this case repeats *Hardwick*'s analytical error of focusing on the identity of the petitioners instead of the substance of the questions raised. Rather than examining whether a being who is intelligent, self-aware, and capable of complex social relationships has asserted a liberty interest that habeas protects, the decision below reflexively bars such claims even from being considered, based on the mere identity of the petitioners rather than on substantive engagement with the values and concerns underlying their claims. Like the Supreme Court's flawed approach in *Hardwick*, its reasoning is circular: Because animals have not brought habeas petitions in the past, they cannot bring them now. Because the petitioners are animals rather than people, their assertion of any liberty interest must be dismissed out of hand, regardless of the potential strength of such a claim on the merits. This is not justice, nor is such blindness to injustice and suffering compelled by our Constitution or the law in all its majesty and scope. "A prime part of the history of our Constitution," as the Supreme Court has noted, "is the story of the extension of constitutional rights and protections to people once ignored or excluded." United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 557 (1996).

As the U.S. Supreme Court has noted, the "writ of habeas corpus is the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action" and must be "administered with the initiative and flexibility essential to ensure that miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and corrected." *Harris v. Nelson*, 394 U.S. 286, 290-91 (1969). "The scope and flexibility of the writ—its capacity to reach all manner of illegal detention—its ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes—have always been emphasized and jealously guarded by courts and lawmakers." *Id.* at 291. These considerations apply equally to the application of habeas petitions in Colorado courts.

Moreover, even if this broad historic flexibility did not exist and habeas relief could be limited arbitrarily only to "persons," the assumption that an animal can never be considered a "person" in this context is flawed in ways that are also reminiscent of the Supreme Court's deficient and subsequently repudiated reasoning in *Hardwick*. There, the Court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims by defining the right to privacy narrowly, to protect only an arbitrarily circumscribed set of relationships, and then finding that gay people could not possibly participate in those relationships. Specifically, the Court held that the fundamental right to privacy applies only to issues related to family, procreation, and marriage, not to "any kind of private sexual

conduct between consenting adults." 478 U.S. at 191. Having found the right to be so strictly limited, the Court then pronounced it "evident that none of the rights announced in [prior] cases bears any resemblance to the claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy that is asserted in this case. No connection between family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other has been demonstrated." *Id.* 190-91.

But as amici argued again and again throughout their careers—during which time the LGBT movement gained traction and successes began to come after long and repeated rejection—rights are not defined by who is denied them. The Supreme Court finally corrected its own prior failure of empathy and inability to acknowledge legitimate claims in Lawrence. There, the Court recognized that the right to privacy is not, as Hardwick claimed, limited to familiar relationships based on marriage and procreation. Instead, transcending mere identity, the Court in Lawrence noted that precedent properly applied meant that "the right to make certain decisions regarding sexual conduct extends beyond the marital relationship." 539 U.S. at 565.

In addition, the Court held that even when it comes to the more typically recognized areas of "personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, and family relationships," what matters is that gay people have the same underlying interests as others. *Id.* at 574. Rather than affirming *Hardwick's* characterization of gay people

as definitionally excluded from these core constitutional interests, *Lawrence* held that, notwithstanding their differences from the majority, "[p]ersons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual persons do." *Id*.

III. The shared liberty interest and the need for relief are similarities that easily outweigh differences concerning an overly narrow definition of personhood.

The Supreme Court's correction of the above errors in *Hardwick* is instructive here in yet another way. In prior cases, the courts have adopted an arbitrarily narrow definition of who is a "person," holding that the term refers exclusively to someone who exercises duties as well as rights, and that such a definition necessarily excludes all animals. *See e.g.*, *Nonhuman Rights Project*, *Inc. v. Breheny*, 38 N.Y.3d 555, 572 (2022) (citing cases). But neither of these assumptions holds water. Rather, as was true of the Court's crabbed definition of the right to privacy in *Hardwick*, the arbitrary judicial limits on who counts as a person and conclusory determination that animals cannot possibly meet that arbitrary standard seem designed to avoid, rather than answer, the important questions presented by these cases.

As Justice Fahey and many others have pointed out, such a narrow rule would exclude children, persons who are ill or incapacitated, and others who indisputably are able to bring habeas petitions in our common law and constitutional traditions.

See 31 N.Y.3d at 1057. When confronted with this seemingly fatal flaw, the courts have responded only that while there may be exceptions to its judicially created definition of "person," these exceptions "are still human beings," not animals. Matter of Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery, 152 A.D.3d 73, 78 (1st Dept. 2017). But that response simply averts the eyes from injustice and suffering, sidestepping the problem. If our legal tradition contains—as it does—many examples of persons who are protected by the right of habeas corpus and yet who are incapable of exercising duties, why is the latter limitation then proper when applied to exclude similarly situated intelligent, self-aware, social beings who happen to be non-human animals? Courts must not so casually evade their duty to apply principle and logic to do justice.

Like the Supreme Court's conclusory definition of the right to privacy in *Hardwick*, the courts that invoked a conclusory definition of "person" rely on a misleadingly partial view of history and law. In *Hardwick*, the Court sought to justify its holding that gay people are excluded from the fundamental right to privacy by claiming that "[p]roscriptions against [same-sex] conduct have ancient roots." 478 U.S. at 192. In *Lawrence*, the Court corrected the record by showing that "the historical grounds relied upon in *Bowers* [v. *Hardwick*] are more complex than the majority opinion and the concurring opinion by Chief Justice Burger indicated. Their

historical premises are not without doubt and, at the very least, are overstated." 539 U.S. at 571. The Court also stressed the importance of more recent legal developments, including especially "an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex." *Id.* at 572.

Similar concerns about oversimplifying history and disregarding the evolution of contemporary law are evident here. In concluding that history does not support courts' jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus petitions on behalf of non-human animals, the courts have overstated the impact of laws that treat animals merely as property and understated the significant and continuing growth of new laws that treat animals as persons. Laws requiring that animals be given a degree of freedom appropriate to their nature and capacities date back to the origins of the common law.² More recently, New York and many other states have enacted laws that expressly treat animals as persons for certain purposes.³ Oregon law recognizes that "animals are

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² Animal Legal & Historical Center, "The Development of the Anti-Cruelty Laws During the 1800's," available at: https://www.animallaw.info/article/development-anti-cruelty-laws-during-1800s.

NY State Senate Bill S4248 (2021),available https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2021/s4248; Dareh Gregorian, "New California divorce law: Treat pets like people — not property to be divided up," News 29. available **NBC** (Dec. 2018), at: https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/new-california-divorce-lawtreat-

sentient beings capable of experiencing pain, stress and fear."⁴ Federal and state courts have recognized that each individual non-human being who suffered because of violation of an animal cruelty law is a crime victim for sentencing purposes.⁵

In addition, the assumption that animals cannot exercise duties is far from self-evident. There are many examples, both historically and now, of circumstances in which animals are treated as responsible agents. For example, historically in medieval Europe, there was a long tradition of prosecuting non-human beings for murder and other crimes and of conducting trials in such cases in which the accused animal was represented by a lawyer. These examples may seem far removed from

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pets-people-not-property-be-n952096; Suzanne Monyak, "When the Law Recognizes Animals as People," The New Republic (Feb. 2, 2018), available at: https://newrepublic.com/article/146870/law-recognizes-animals-people; Animal Legal Defense Fund, "California's New 'Pet Custody' Law Differentiates Companion Animals from Other Types of Property," available at: https://aldf.org/article/californias-new-pet-custody-lawdifferentiates-companion-animals-from-other-types-of-property/.

⁴ Or. Rev. Stat. § 167.305.

⁵ Animal Legal Defense Fund, "Animals as Crime Victims: Development of a New Legal Status," available at: https://aldf.org/article/animals-as-crime-victims-development-of-a-newlegal-status/.

⁶ See, e.g., Sara M. Butler, "Persons under the Law? Medieval Animal Rights – Legal History Miscellany," available at: https://legalhistorymiscellany.com/2018/02/19/persons-under-the-lawmedieval-animals-rights/; Philip Johnson, "The Advocate, or the Hour of the Pig," available at: https://animalsmattertogod.com/2012/05/25/the-advocate-or-the-hour-of-the-pig/; Katie Sykes, Human Drama, Animal Trials: What the Medieval Animal Trials Can Teach Us About Justice for Animals, 17 ANIMAL L. 273 (2011), available at: https://www.animallaw.info/sites/default/files/lralvol17 2 273.pdf.

our current reality; nonetheless, they underscore the seriousness of this question and the error of simply assuming, without careful investigation, that the concept of animals as legally responsible agents has no place in our legal tradition. As a matter of historical accuracy, the opposite is true.

Today, while we no longer prosecute animals for crimes, there are many contexts in which animals have significant responsibilities, including in matters of life and death. For example, dogs perform a wide variety of critical jobs, from tracking kidnapped children and lost hikers⁷ to detecting diseases⁸, sniffing out

⁷ KTVL, "Shady Cove woman recovered after getting lost in wilderness" (Jan. 3, 2022), available at: https://ktvl.com/news/local/shady-cove-woman-recoveredafter-getting-lost-inwilderness; Kelli Bender, "Connecticut Police Dog Finds Missing 10-Year-Old Girl," PEOPLE (Dec. 15, 2021), available https://people.com/pets/connecticut-police-dog-finds-missing-girl/; Cooper, Marni Hughes, "Search and rescue dogs look for tornado victims in Kentucky," NewsNation (Dec. 14, 2021), available at: https://www.newsnationnow.com/prime/search-andrescue-dogs-look-for-tornadovictims-in-kentucky/.

⁸ Simon Spichak, MSc, "Training Dogs to Diagnose Parkinson's," Being Patient (Dec. 13, 2021), available at: https://www.beingpatient.com/dogs-sniff-dementia/; Dark Daily, "New Study Shows Dogs Can be Trained to Sniff Out Presence of Prostate Cancer in Urine Samples" (Dec. 10. 2021), https://www.darkdaily.com/2021/12/10/new-study-shows-dogs-can-betrainedto-sniff-out-presence-of-prostate-cancer-in-urine-samples/; Clara Benitez, "COVID sniffing dogs: 2 dogs trained to smell virus in people," Fox5 San Diego (Nov. 18, 2021), available at: https://fox5sandiego.com/news/coronavirus/sniffing-out-covidhow-these-2-pupswere-trained-to-detect-the-virus-in-people/; Kim Bellware and Adela Suliman, "Coronavirus sniffing dogs unleashed at Miami International Airport to detect virus in employees," Washington Post (Sept. 9, 2021), available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2021/09/09/covid-sniffer-dogs/; Leslie

unlawful drugs or explosives,⁹ protecting businesses and homes¹⁰, providing transportation in remote areas¹¹, and many other critical tasks. Across the country, dogs, horses, and other animals support individuals who are blind or have mental

Nemo, "How Do Dogs Sniff Out Diseases?," Discover Magazine (July 19, 2021), available at: https://www.discovermagazine.com/the-sciences/how-do-dogs-sniff-out-diseases.

⁹ Erin Tracy, "Modesto CHP dog trained at Disneyland, provided security for Mike Pence. Now he's retiring," Modesto Bee (Dec. 30, 2021), available at: https://www.modbee.com/news/local/article256899017.html; Penny Leigh, Dogs in Demand for Explosives Detection Work in U.S.," American Kennel Club (Apr. 13, 2018), available at: https://www.akc.org/expert-advice/news/dogs-in-demand-explosives-detection-us/; U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, "Federal Protective Service Explosive Detection Canine Teams," available at: https://www.dhs.gov/explosive-detection-canine-teams.

¹⁰ Ian Randal, "Archaeology: Funerary complex dating back up to 2,000 years dug up in Rome included a dog statue," Daily Mail Online (Jan. 3, 2022), available at: https://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-10364395/Archaeology-Funerary-complexdating-2-000-years-dug-Rome-included-dog-statue.html; Mark Ellwood, "These Elite \$125,000 Guard Dogs Are Trained to Detect Danger Before It Happens," Robb Report (Aug. 3, 2021), available at: https://robbreport.com/lifestyle/svalinn-guard-dogs-1234622969/; Poppy Koronka, "The Best Guard Dogs, According to Experts," Newsweek (Jul. 16, 2021), available at: https://www.newsweek.com/best-guard-dogs-according-experts-1609598.

American Kennel Club, "Sled Dog Breeds: From Arctic Exploration to the Iditarod" (Nov. 22, 2020), available at: https://www.akc.org/expert-advice/dog-breeds/sled-dog-breeds-historyfuture/; Sara Kiley Watson, "Humans have partnered with sled dogs for 9,500 years," Popular Science (Jul. 14, 2020), available at: https://www.popsci.com/story/animals/sled-dog/; Kitson Jazynka, "Denali has only sled dogs in National Park Service," Washington Post (Feb. 19, 2018), available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/kidspost/park-ranger-needs-furry-friendsto-help-get-around-the-alaskan-wilds/2018/02/16/5323ca6c-0b62-11e8-95a5-c396801049ef story.html.

health issues. ¹² The U.S. military counts on dolphins to detect underwater mines. ¹³ Animals paved the way for human space flight. ¹⁴ Horses and dogs play an essential role on many cattle ranches and sheep farms. Trained monkeys provide lifesaving support for people with spinal cord injuries. ¹⁵ And, as this case itself demonstrates,

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¹² Tiffany Rizzo, "At Naples Therapeutic Center, horses help with grief and mental health," Wink News (Dec. 2021), available 16. at: https://www.winknews.com/2021/12/16/at-naplestherapeutic-center-horses-helpwith-grief-and-mental-health/; Jen Reeder, "Former CIA analyst shares adventures with guide dogs over 33-year career," TODAY (Sept. 29, 2021), available at: https://www.today.com/pets/former-cia-analyst-shares-adventures-guide-dogsover-33-yeart232486; Univ. of Toledo, "Study finds evidence emotional support animals benefit those with chronic mental illness," Newswise (May 20, 2021), available at: https://www.newswise.com/articles/study-finds-evidence-emotionalsupport-animals-benefitthose-with-chronic-mental-illness; "Guide Dogs for the Blind and American Foundation for the Blind Launch Extensive Research Study," Wire 21. available Business (Oct. 2020), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20201021005166/en/Guide-Dogs-forthe-Blind-and-American-Foundation-for-the-Blind-Launch-Extensive-Research-Study.

¹³ John Ismay, "Why Whales and Dolphins Join the Navy, in Russia and the U.S.," New York Times Magazine (Apr. 30, 2019), available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/30/magazine/beluga-whale-russia-military-dolphins.html.

¹⁴ Samantha Mathewson, "Celebrating the animal astronauts who paved the way for human spaceflight," Space (Dec. 28, 2021), available at: https://www.space.com/animals-in-spacehistory-human-spaceflight.

¹⁵ Jeffrey Kluger, "Strong and Smart, Service Monkeys Give a Helping Hand to People With Quadriplegia," TIME (Oct. 24, 2018), available at: https://time.com/longform/service-monkeysquadriplegia/.

elephants and other animals often work long hours to provide entertainment in multiple settings, from zoos and parks to television and movie productions. ¹⁶

In sum, it is simply untrue that animals do not bear significant duties and responsibilities in our culture. They do, and this Court should address the important question of whether they also have a right to, or at least some meaningful interest in, liberty. The alternative, as Justice Fahey has noted, is to treat even an intelligent, self-aware animal "as a mere resource for human use, a thing the value of which consists exclusively in its usefulness to others" and to avoid "consider[ing] whether a chimpanzee [or an elephant] is an individual with inherent value who has the right to be treated with respect." 31 N.Y.S.3d at 1058 (Fahey, J., concurring). There must at least be a range between the all-or-nothing of subject or object, protected being or but a thing—and it is the obligation of courts to consider appeals for relief, rather than turn them away.

¹⁶ Ann Lee, "What's new, pussycat? How feline film stars are trained to perform," The Guardian (Jan. 3, 2022), available at: https://www.theguardian.com/film/2022/jan/03/whats-new-pussycathow-feline-film-stars-are-trained-to-perform; Meredith Geaghan-Breiner and Kyle Desiderio, "How 10 Different Types of Animals Train for Film and TV Roles," Insider (Apr. 19, 2021), available at: https://www.insider.com/how-animal-trainers-wranglers-train-bugs-animals-formovies-tv-2021-3.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, this Court should reverse the District Court's ruling and remand the case with instructions to issue a writ of habeas corpus, and grant such other and further relief as may be just and proper.

Dated: May 22, 2024.

Respectfully submitted,

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on May 22, 2024, a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF AMICI CURIAE OF SHANNON MINTER AND EVAN WOLFSON, was electronically filed and served via Colorado Courts E-Filing on the following counsel of record:

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